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Politics in Iowa is what Hugh Latimer and Mayor Gatnor
would call "mish-mash." Senator Brookhart, renominated in
the Republican primary, is going up and down the State de-
nouncing Mr. Coolidge as the candidate of the "Wall Street
bloc." Members of the Old Guard are supporting the Demo-
cratic nominee for Senator whom, for various reasons, con-
siderable numbers of Democrats reject. Mr. Brookhart is a
thorough La FoUettian but technically a regular Republican.
He called for the withdrawal of General Dawes from the
Republican ticket. The Republican State Committee, whose
thunder seems to make the Iowans laugh, "read him out of
the party." Things looked very bad to the Republicans.'
FOR THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Iowa politi-
cal alignments were seriously disturbed by the continuing strug-
gle between progressives and "standpats" for control of the Re-
publican party. Following World War I, however, the line
between the two wings of the party became less distinct, and the
conservative "standpats" began to hope that they could regain
control of the party. The candidacy of Smith W. Brookhart for
the Senate seat held by Albert B. Cummins aided their efforts by
dividing the progressive ranks. Between 1920 and 1926, a period
when Brookhart was a candidate for the Senate in seven primary
and general elections, the single goal of defeating him subsumed
all other party considerations. Ironically, opposition by party
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Iowa College
Teachers of History conference in 1985.
1. New York Times, 31 October 1924.
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leaders to Brookhart's repeated candidacy eventually reunited
the two wings of the party.
Unity did not finally come, though, until after the "mish-
mash" years of 1924 to 1926, when the Republican and Demo-
cratic parties rallied behind the leadership of a new political ac-
tion group, the Republican Service League, and joined forces to
remove Brookhart from the Senate. By the end of 1926, how-
ever, Brookhart was safely back in the Senate, and the Iowa Re-
publican party was more united than it had been in a quarter of
a century.
BROOKHART began his political career in 1894 when he was
elected to the first of three terms as Washington County Attor-
ney. After the turn of the century he joined the progressive wing
of the Republican party, formed a longtime relationship with
Albert B. Cummins, and developed a lifelong opposition to pri-
vate ownership of the railroads. Convinced that the railroads
were subverting the democratic process, he came to believe that
government ownership of the railroads afforded the only means
to prevent future abuses. Together with Cummins and other
progressives, Brookhart fought for a series of political and eco-
nomic reforms.
In 1920, however, Brookhart split with Cummins over the
Esch-Cummins Transportation Act, which would return railroads
to private control after a period of wartime governmental opera-
tion. As Brookhart saw it, Cummins's cosponsorship of the act was
a sellout to the railroads. When Cummins ran for renomination to
his third term as United States senator, Brookhart opposed him.
Standpats who had lost control of the party years before rallied to
support Cummins. This shift began to close the gap in the party
that had begun twenty years before. Brookhart lost the election but
received 45 percent of the primary vote.^
In 1922 Brookhart seized another opportunity to run for the
Senate. In February of that year President Warren G. Harding
appointed William S. Kenyon, Iowa's junior senator and
longtime friend of Brookhart, to the federal bench, leaving two
years of his Senate term unfilled. Brookhart immediately an-
nounced his candidacy for the seat. The result was another clash
2. Iowa Official Register, 1921-1922, 424-25.
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with the Republican regulars. Ironically, in their effort to defeat
him, the party regulars tried to take advantage of an early pro-
gressive reform measure which required a candidate to receive
at least 35 percent of the primary vote. If none did so, the choice
was left up to the state convention.
Although Brookhart ran on a platform of farm relief, party
leaders saw Brookhart himself as the issue. In the hope of deny-
ing him the necessary 35 percent of the vote, they flooded the
field with five other candidates. To the surprise of everyone but
Brookhart, he received 41.1 percent of the vote. The general
election was much the same story. At the end of that campaign
Austin Haines wrote in The Nation, "Brookhart goes his way,
practically alone, saying nothing in commendation of the Re-
publican Administration, asking no favors of the organization,
and avoiding any strictly partisan appeal, confident of his
strength with the mass of voters on election day." In spite of the
efforts of conservative Republicans, he won the election with 63
percent of the vote.^
Brookhart had no sooner been elected in 1922 than discus-
sion began about defeating him in 1924. In the primary that year
Brookhart tried to make farm relief the major issue. Instead, two
other issues quickly came to the fore: Brookhart's Republicanism
and his Americanism. In the Red Scare era, his longtime advo-
cacy of government ownership of the railroads, combined with
his espousal of marketing cooperatives for farmers, made him
suspect. Then in 1923 he took a trip to Russia, where he made fa-
vorable comments about the new Soviet government. Combin-
ing these themes, his opponent's campaign literature said that
Iowans should vote for a Republican who advocated Republican
principles and policies and who did not impeach the "idealism of
America" by comparing the "stability of [the American] govern-
ment to that of the Russian Soviet." Still, Brookhart remained a
strong favorite throughout the campaign, and when the votes
were counted he had received 55 percent of the total.''
3. Austin Haines, "Smith W. Brookhart, Dissenter," The Nation, 1 No-
vember 1922, 446; ¡oiua Official Register, 1923-1924, 392-93, 491-96.
4. Campaign pamphlet. President Jessup Papers, University of Iowa Li-
braries, Iowa City; Des Moines Register, 22 June 1924; Iowa Official Register,
1925-1926,420-21.
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On July 22 Iowa Republicans gathered in Des Moines for the
regular state convention. Some delegates were ready to accept the
verdict of the primaries and issue a general endorsement of all Re-
publican candidates for office, including Brookhart, without spe-
cifically naming any. But others wanted a resolution endorsing
only those Republican candidates who would endorse the national
ticket of Calvin Coolidge and Charles G. Dawes. Asked whether he
would support the national ticket, Brookhart said simply, "I'll do as
much for Coolidge as he does for me."^ Although many observers
predicted a stormy convention, it proved to be remarkably calm.
Delegates endorsed Coolidge and Dawes, but no other candidates
for any office. The platform catered to both the progressive forces
and the anti-Brookhart elements. On the one hand, it congratu-
lated Iowa for being second to no other state in passing forward-
looking legislation promoting the safety, health, happiness, and
prosperity of its citizens. On the other hand, it stated that "real Re-
publicans have never believed and never wül beUeve that to be pro-
gressive they must also be Socialists or Communists or Reds or
members of or in sympathy with other like organizations seeking
the overthrow of the institutions which made America great
and/or our Constitution, which has made the United States the
foremost nation of the world."^
In mid-August Federal Reserve Board member and Iowan
Edward H. Cunningham wrote to Republican National Com-
mitteeman Charles A. Rawson asking about the truth of current
Washington rumors that some Iowa Republicans were working
to defeat Brookhart. Calling such a possibility "political chica-
nery," Cunningham told Rawson, "Mr. Brookhart has been over-
whelmingly nominated. He has been able to carry the Republi-
can Primaries of Iowa through two very bitter fights and the
least I think that the opposition can now do is to at least submit
to the will of the people and put all of their strength and support
back of that Republican ticket."^ Cunningham and Rawson rep-
resented the attitude of many "common sense" Republicans de-
5. Des Moines Register, 11 June 1924.
6. Iowa Official Register, 1925-1926, 308.
7. Cunningham to Rawson, 19 August 1924, Charles A. Rawson Papers,
State Historical Sodety of Iowa, Des Moines. A former seaetary of the Iowa Farm
Bureau Federation, in 1924 Cunningham was a member of the Federal Reserve
Board.
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termined to make the best of a situation they did not like. Others,
however, took a different tack. In so doing they brought on the
"mish-mash" years.
A N EARLIER R/WSON CORRESPONDENT had indicated the course
these irreconcilables would take. Writing on February 8, James J.
Lenihan, formerly of Cedar Rapids and now in the Justice De-
partment, complained to Rawson that Brookhart had been vot-
ing with the Democrats in the Senate and had spoken favorably
of the recently deceased Woodrow Wilson. Lenihan then asked
Rawson, since Brookhart was "making such a good Democrat on
the Republican ticket, why a Democrat might not be made a
good Republican on the Democratic ticket."^ Other Republicans
were thinking along similar lines, and even before the June pri-
mary were beginning a movement to support Democrat Dan
Steck for senator.
An Ottumwa lawyer. Steck served from 1912 to 1916 as
Wapello County Attorney. In 1917 he enlisted in the Iowa Na-
tional Guard. Shortly thereafter, he was commissioned by the
governor to raise a signal company, and as captain of the 109th
Field Signal Battery he saw service in France. After discharge in
May 1919, he returned home to his law practice. Like many vet-
erans, he joined the American Legion, rising quickly through the
ranks of the Iowa Legion until, at the third state Legion conven-
tion, held in September 1921, Steck was elected State Com-
mander. As a delegate to the national convention later that fall
he placed the name of Hanford MacNider of Mason City before
the convention as National Commander. The convention re-
sponded by electing MacNider by acclamation. A month later
MacNider wrote to Steck, "I have great faith in you and what you
are doing for the Legion in Iowa. We look to you and your De-
partment for inspiration to carry throughout the nation, and we
offer you and Iowa all that is within the powers of National
Headquarters."^
8. Lenihan to Rawson, 8 February 1924, Rawson Papers. I could find no
record of any response by Rawson to Lenihan's suggestion.
9. Jacob A. Swisher, The American Legion in Iowa, 1919-1926 (Iowa City,
1929), 139; MacNider to Steck, 12 December 1921, Hanford MacNider Pa-
pers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch.
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Like similar groups in other nations, the Legion was in the-
ory a social service organization, stressing the ideal of war-born
comradeship kept alive in continuing bonds of "mutual helpful-
ness," service to "community, state, and nation," and dedication
to correct social principles. According to its constitution, it was to
be "absolutely nonpartisan" and was not to engage in the dis-
semination of partisan literature or advocate any political candi-
dacy. ^ ° Yet in June 1924, shortly after the Republican National
Convention, Hanford MacNider and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,
one of the founders of the American Legion, organized the Re-
publican Service League. Although technically the league was a
separate organization, it was always closely allied with the
American Legion, and it also quickly formed an alliance with the
Republican party. The founders' goals were to ensure that the
Republican party would not "atrophy," to rally "the younger
element who are more plastic," and to make them "active
participaters [sic]" in party affairs. As MacNider explained it to
B. B. Burnquist, chairman of the Iowa State Republican party,
the men involved were "engaged in organizing inside the Repub-
lican Party the serviceman generation to sell them the National
ticket and to put them actively at work inside the party for the
good of all concerned.""
In July Roosevelt met with President Coolidge, who
thought that the league was a "very excellent idea." At about the
same time, MacNider met with William M. Butler, chairman of
the Republican party, to solicit his support. MacNider received
assurances that the organization would be taken care of when it
established its headquarters in Chicago. From July on MacNider
and Roosevelt were in almost daily contact, particularly about
funding, or, as MacNider put it, the need to "finance liberally the
headquarters in those states which are considered unstable." By
election day the Republican National Committee had paid al-
most $2,500 for the league's office and travel and had advanced
it another $15,000 for other
10. Swisher, Legion in Iowa, 8.
11. Roosevelt, form letter, 5 September 1924; MacNider to B. B.
Burnquist, 23 September 1924, Republican Service League, 1924 State File,
Iowa: General, MacNider Papers.
12. Roosevelt to MacNider, 18 July 1924; MacNider to Roosevelt, 18 Au-
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It is not clear who made the suggestion to Dan Steck that
hé run for United States senator. But on March 21, 1924, he
wrote to MacNider about the suggestion and asked for his
"frank, open reaction." MacNider was not optimistic. The
chances were not good, he thought, of getting "many people
in such a solid Republican state to wander across the column"
and vote for a Democrat. But he acknowledged the problems
that he and the regular Republicans were having and encour-
aged Steck to seek the Democratic nomination "if you intend
to stay with that Party.""
Steck left no doubt concerning where his loyalties were. On
March 25, he wrote to MacNider, "I am not a party man in the or-
dinary sense of the term, and am ready to become a MacNider
Republican any time you see fit to step forth." Steck announced
his candidacy and in the resulting contest won the nomination
with 38 percent of the 54,694 votes cast. MacNider was pleased.
Writing to Steck on June 6, he expressed his belief that "if the
proper organization was built up and enough money could be
raised for publicity that you could give old man Brookhart a race
for his life."'"
On September 18 Louis Fay, publisher of Fay's Democrat,
Clinton, Iowa, reported that he had never seen "party lines . . .
more loosely drawn than they are this season."'^ Not only were
substantial groups of Republicans and Democrats supporting
the other party's candidate, there was also speculation that
Brookhart might join the third party formed by Robert M. La
Follette in his bid for the presidency.'^ The Brookhart forces
strongly denied the rumor, of course. Roy Rankin, Brookhart's
secretary, called it "an absolute lie made out of the whole cloth,"
gust 1924, 31 August 1924, Republican Service League, 1924 State File, Iowa:
General, MacNider Papers: Stubs of Republican National Committee checks.
Republican Service League, 1924, General File, Expense Vouchers, MacNider
Papers. The expense checks were issued in response to statements presented
by the Republican Service League.
13. Steck to MacNider, 21 March 1924; MacNider to Steck, 22 March
1924, Steck, Daniel, MacNider Papers.
14. Steck to MacNider, 25 March 1924; MacNider to Steck, 6 June 1924,
ibid.; Iowa Official Register, 1925-1926, 426-27.
15. Fay to Cummins, 18 September 1924, Albert B. Cummins Papers,
State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
16. Des Moines Register, 22 April 1924.
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and Brookhart denied that a rumored meeting on a third party
had ever taken place. But Iowa Republicans remained uncon-
vinced, some feeling certain that Brookhart would at least en-
dorse the La Follette candidacy."'
As the summer ended, however, Brookhart refused to en-
dorse either La Follette or Coolidge, preferring, as the New York
Times commented, to stay on the fence "until the drear days of
November come." In outlook, the Times noted, Brookhart
seemed more "La Follettian" than La Follette himself. Rawson
also observed that many Brookhart supporters were pro-La
Follette and that "the kind of speeches [Brookhart] is making are
similar to those La Follette makes." But, as Rawson said else-
where, the senator was "pretty sure of re-election," and remain-
ing on the political fence seemed to be a winning strategy.'^
It took Luther Brewer, a longtime Republican newspaper
publisher from Cedar Rapids, to knock Brookhart off the fence.
On September 24 Brewer announced his candidacy for the
United States Senate. In the announcement he declared, "I am a
Republican who believes in President Coolidge... a Republican
who believes in the preservation of the Constitution, a Republi-
can who has faith in Iowa and her people." Brewer's announce-
ment took Iowa Republican leaders by surprise. They had not
been consulted prior to the announcement, and none thought
that the state committee would endorse Brewer. James Lenihan
wrote that the candidacy was "unpardonable." It created an
issue that would not have existed, he wrote, "and gave an excuse
to an all-too-willing Brookhart to jump the fence."'^
Lenihan's worst fears were realized when Brookhart came
home from a trip to Ohio and proceeded to abandon his policy of
declining comment on tbe national ticket. Jumping off the fence,
he landed with one foot squarely on vice-presidential candidate
Charles G. Dawes, calling him an "agent of international bank-
ing powers" and demanding his resignation from the ticket.
17. Rankin to Rawson, 30 April 1924, Rawson Papers; Des Moines Regis-
ter, 3 May 1924; New York Times, 2 May 1924.
18. New York Times, 25 July 1924, 29 September 1924; Rawson to Reed
Lane, 4 September 1924, Rawson Papers; Rawson to Ray C. Meyer, 30 August
1924, Rawson Papers.
19. Des Moines Register, 25 September 1924; Lenihan to Rawson, 15 Oc-
tober 1924, Rawson Papers.
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Dawes, he said, "started out like a bold-faced plutogog but his
discourtesy and ungentlemanly language quickly reduced him,
in his own vocabulary, to a peewit plutogog." The attack pro-
duced what the New York Times called a "sensation." "The La
Follette people," it reported, "were joyous. The Democrats were
watching. The Republicans were silent."^"
As they waited for the other foot to land, most political ob-
servers expected it to come down with an open endorsement of La
Follette and an open attack on Coolidge. They were only half
right. In Emmetsburg, Iowa, on October 3, Brookhart openly at-
tacked the president and his policies, ticking off a litany of issues
on which they differed. "I belong to the farm bloc," he declared.
"The President belongs to the Wall Street bloc." The expected
endorsement of La Follette, however, did not come. Instead,
Brookhart declared that he had "never thought of leaving the
party," that his whole soul was "wrapped up in the principles of
Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Kenyon." He also restated his convention
promise to "do as much for Coolidge as he would for me."^'
Nevertheless, the Republican State Committee wasted no
time in declaring that Brookhart had "bolted" from the party. His
speech, it said, constituted an attempt to take over the party ma-
chinery and to become the dictator of Iowa politics. The party
withdrew formal support, but in practical terms that meant lit-
tle. Yet the speech and subsequent developments did provide a
rallying point for Brookhart's diverse opponents. The regular
Republicans, the Republican Service League, and the Democrats
each tried to capitalize on the incident.
The Republican Service League came up with a strategy
that would prove important in defeating Brookhart. Many Re-
publicans, it felt, would vote for Steck if they could be broken of
their habit of voting a straight Republican ticket. To educate
them, the league proposed issuing sample ballots that showed
an "X" in the circle at the top of the Republican column and an
"X" in the square beside Dan Steck's name on the Democratic
ticket. The league disseminated the sample ballot throughout
Iowa. A number of newspapers ran it on the front page. It was
also used as a poster and appeared wherever Republicans might
20. Des Moines Register, 25 September 1924; New York Times, 1 October 1924.
21. New YorfcT/mes, 4 October 1924.
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.^ ^ MacNider thought that the sample ballot was "a splen-
did idea" and hoped that it did "the trick."23 Still, on November 2
C. C. Clifton, the Des Moines Register's political analyst, wrote,
"There is little doubt Senator Brookhart will be re-elected."^''
For several days after the election, however, it was unclear
who had the lead. On the morning of November 6, two days
after the election, the Register proclaimed that Steck had won by
four thousand votes. Brookhart conceded defeat, and Steck is-
sued a victory statement declaring that he owed the election to
"loyal Democrats, Republicans who place ideals above party fe-
alty, and service men of all parties." Subsequent returns, how-
ever, changed the count, and the next morning the Register an-
nounced that Brookhart had a lead of 1,116 votes.^ ^
It was apparent that there would be a recount, so Clyde L.
Herring, Democratic National Committeeman, moved quickly
to insure that ballots and machines would not be tampered with.
He also called a strategy meeting in his office, bringing together
several prominent Democrats. Others, too, were concerned, and
before the meeting ended, as the Register described it, a "peculiar
drama was enacted." Into the group, "arm in arm," walked the
Polk County Republican and Democratic chairmen, "both pull-
ing for the election of Steck and both anxious to have all ballots
safeguarded in Steck's interest."^^
As the recount progressed the state and country were kept
apprised of the results. Page two headlines in the New York Times
announced on November 8 and 13, "Brookhart Faces Contest,"
and "Brookhart's Lead Rises to 65O."27 On November 24 the re-
count ended, with Brookhart now leading Steck by 755 votes out
of almost nine hundred thousand cast. Accordingly, the State of
Iowa declared Brookhart the winner and awarded him a certifi-
cate of election.
22. In Brookhart Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines, there
is a poster taken from a filling station in Tama, on November 9, 1924.
23. MacNider to Lee, 27 October 1924, Republican Service League, 1924
State File, Iowa: General, MacNider Papers.
24. Des Moines Register, 2 November 1924.
25. Des Moines Register, 6 and 7 November 1924.
26. Des Moines Register, 7 November 1924.
27. New York Times, 8 and 13 November 1924. See also ibid., 11 and 12
November 1924.
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EVEN BEFORE BROOKHART had been issued his certificate of elec-
tion, his opponents were preparing to contest the results in the
Senate.2^ The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections cre-
ated a special subcommittee to consider the Brookhart-Steck
contest. Dan Steck filed a challenge to the election, claiming that
many ballots were wrongly counted and that others that should
have been counted were not. The Iowa Republican State Central
Committee also contested the election, charging that Brookhart
was not in fact a Republican and had therefore been elected
under false pretenses.^'
The subcommittee met on July 20, 1925, but the meeting
lasted only long enough to order that a recount be taken of all the
ballots. "Many ballots," the subcommittee decided, were rejected in
Iowa "on the illegal and fraudulent pretext that they bore distin-
guishing marks."3° Prominent among the ballots with "distinguish-
ing marks" were the so-called arrow ballots, created when voters
literally reproduced the arrows that some of the newspapers had
drawn from the Republican side of sample ballots to Steck's
name.3' Since Iowa's attorney general had ruled that Iowa law for-
bade any identification mark on the ballot, those ballots had not
been allowed during the official canvas in Iowa.
The counters then examined each of the nine hundred
thousand ballots cast, seeking, as instructed by the committee,
to ascertain the intent of the voter. This meant that they ignored
the Iowa law about distinguishing marks. The "arrow ballots,"
which were counted for Steck since that was what the voters
had intended, provided a winning margin for Steck. Thus, the
committee declared that Daniel F. Steck, and not Smith W.
28. Governor Kendall sent the certificate to Cummins, telling the senator
it was done "as required by the rules of the Senate as I interpret them." Kendall
to Cummins, 8 December 1924, General Correspondence, Governor Kendall
Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
29. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Privi-
leges and Elections, Hearings, 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1925, 117.
30. Ibid., 9-10.
31. The Council Bluffs Nonpareil printed the sample ballot on page one of
its November 2 issue. Beneath the ballot was a caption explaining that here
was reproduced "a ballot correctly marked" to scratch a ticket. Many voters no
doubt felt that to "correctly mark" their ballots they needed to include the
arrow shown on the sample.
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Brookhart, was elected in 1924 and was therefore entitled to a
seat in the United States Senate from Iowa.^ ^
While the counters and the committee spent the summer
and fall doing their job, Hanford MacNider was busy pleading
Steck's case. As early as February 1925 he had been in Washing-
ton calling on senators. And following his appointment as assist-
ant secretary of war in the fall of 1925, he acquired a privileged
platform from which to operate. In early September he wrote to
Steck, "Those closest to the President know what kind of fellow
you are because I have made it a point to see that they did." This
seems to have been particularly true of Senator William M. But-
ler, who had been appointed to the Senate in November 1924 to
fill the vacancy created by the death of Henry Cabot Lodge and
to become, in the words of William Allen White, the president's
"vicegerent." Steck and MacNider hoped that he would continue
to be a valuable ally. "It is my opinion," Steck wrote to MacNider,
"that if it comes to a contest on the floor of the Senate, that the
administration's wishes will prevail, and that Senator Butier
speaks for the administration."^^
At the same time, the Republican Service League was work-
ing on Senator Cummins to insure that he would not support his
Senate colleague. Writing to the senator in December 1925, the
league's state chairman, Charles B. Robbins, indicated that the
32. Brookhart challenged the committee's procedures on three grounds.
(1) He said the committee had no right to ignore Iowa law regarding "extrane-
ous marks" on ballots (like the arrow ballots). (2) He also said the committee
had failed to count a number of ballots that Brookhart contended were prop-
erly marked according to Iowa law. The committee held, however, that the in-
tent of the voter could not be precisely determined in those cases, so the bal-
lots were not counted. (3) Finally, Brookhart charged that although all the
packets of ballots had been sealed in Iowa before shipping, some seals were
broken when the packets arrived in Washington, D.C. Without actually claim-
ing that the ballots had been tampered with, he said that that possibility ex-
isted and that therefore the outcome was possibly flawed. The committee de-
termined that the seals had broken accidentally in transit. In all three cases,
the committee rejected Brookhart's challenges, and the full Senate upheld the
committee report. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Privileges and Elec-
tions, Report of the Committee Together with Minority View, 69th Cong., 1st
sess., 1926.
33. Steck to MacNider, 18 February 1925; MacNider to Steck, 3 Septem-
ber 1925, Steck, Daniel, MacNider Papers; Steck to MacNider, 13 January
1926, Steck, Daniel, MacNider Papers; William Allen White, A Puritan in Bab-
ylon (New York, 1938), 309.
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one hundred thousand men and women of the Republican Serv-
ice League in Iowa wanted Steck seated and would "resent" any
"political expediency" in favor of Brookhart.^" In February 1926,
following MacNider's request for a "barrage" from Iowa, the
campaign intensified. Robbins wrote on behalf of the Republi-
can Service League of the second district. Other letters arrived
from various parts of the state.^^
Cummins, though, was in a delicate situation. He was up
for reelection in the June 1926 primary, and it was well known
that if Brookhart were unseated he would also be a candidate in
the primary. So a vote to seat Brookhart would appear as an ef-
fort to avoid facing him. A vote to unseat him, on the other hand,
could be interpreted as vindictive. Nor could Cummins, as some
suggested, allow the matter to be delayed in the Senate beyond
the filing date for the primary. This, too, would appear as
though Cummins were afraid to face Brookhart. To Cummins
neutrality seemed tbe best course to follow. As early as February
1925 he had taken the position that the contest was a judicial
question requiring a determination based on the facts, and time
and again he was forced to explain that position. As he told
Cedar Rapids Gazette editor Verne Marshall in January 1926, he
was having trouble making either friends or enemies believe that
he was a "reasonable, honest man." Still, he thought, the matter
ought to be settled according to the facts, whatever the conse-
quences. He intended, at least to have the approval of his "own
conscience."^^
On March 27,1926, the Committee on Privileges and Elec-
tions reported out the resolution, and on April 5 the Senate
began floor debate. Although the committee favored seating
Steck, approval by the full Senate was by no means certain, es-
34. Robbins to Cummins, 29 December 1925, Cummins Papers. Robbins
apparently exaggerated the membership figure for Cummins's benefit. On
January 18,1926, Robbins wrote to MacNider and reported that the "strength
of organization is 45,000 men, plenty of pep, prestige and enthusiasm."
Robbins would be more likely to give MacNider an accurate number and to in-
flate the membership to lobby Cummins. However, 45,000 men, if properly
organized, would have been a potent force. Robbins to MacNider, 18 January
1926, General Correspondence, MacNider Papers.
35. MacNider to Steck, 1 February 1926, Steck, Daniel, MacNider Pa-
pers; Various writers to Cummins, February 1926, Cummins Papers.
36. Des Moines Register, 6 February 1925; Cummins to Verne Marshall,
31 January 1926, Cummins Papers.
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pecially since Senator Butler and the regular Republicans feared
that seating Steck would lead Brookhart to enter the Iowa pri-
mary that June, when he might well defeat Cummins, who was
running for reelection. This could result in a replay of the 1924
elections; regular Republicans might again align themselves
with the Democrats and elect another Democrat from Iowa.^ ^
Meanwhile, Hanford MacNider was busy lobbying for
Steck, building, as he said, "little bonfires wherever possible." In
late March, he was "as nervous as a witch about the outcome."^^
He decided to concentrate particularly on Senator Butler, who
was reluctantly supporting Brookhart. MacNider arranged for
"numerous" telegrams to be sent to Butler.^ ^ By Wednesday,
April 7, Butler was beginning to waver in his support of Brook-
hart. His weakening stance, when coupled with MacNider's
activities as a member of the administration, lent considerable
credence to the rumors that the president himself wanted
Brookhart unseated.-»" During the first few days of the debate,
MacNider was out of Washington. Returning on April 9, he
quickly went to Capitol Hill and proceeded to light more "bon-
fires."" By that time the Iowa Democratic and Republican orga-
nizations had both endorsed Steck.
Under the rules adopted, the Senate was to close debate and
vote at 5:00 P.M. on Monday, April 12. By mid-afternoon that day
the galleries were filled. Among the Iowans present were
Hanford MacNider, his wife, and E. J. Feuling, Iowa Democratic
37. Des Moines Register, 6 April 1926; New York Times, 8 April 1926.
38. MacNider to Steck, 20 March 1926, Steck, Daniel, MacNider Papers;
MacNider to Halligan, 23 March 1926, Halligan, Bert L., MacNider Papers.
MacNider's anxiety increased as the days passed. On April 1 he wrote to
Robbins, "Dan's case comes before the Senate today and I am shivering like a
dog full offish hooks.. . . [added in pencil] Tomorrow they say now—perhaps
Monday—Damn em." MacNider to Robbins, 1 April 1926, Robbins, C. B.,
MacNider Papers.
39. Robbins to MacNider, 6 April 1926, Robbins, C. B., MacNider Papers.
40. The New York Times reported (8 April 1926) that there were rumors in
the Senate cloakrooms that the president had "read the riot act" to Butler, in-
sisting that Steck should be seated. The next day (9 April 1926) the Times re-
ported that this allegation was denied, but that the rumors persisted.
41. MacNider spent Saturday, April 10, in the Senate lobby talking with
senators and urging them to vote for Steck. It is known that he talked with
Senators David A. Reed (R-PA), George H. Moses (R-NH), Porter H. Dale
(R-VT), Frank B. Willis (R-OH), and Simeon D. Fess (R-OH), as well as Butler.
Telegram to Sioux City Tribune, 12 May 1926, Kelly, John H., MacNider Papers.
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state chairman. The action was frantic. As MacNider later de-
scribed it, "At 3 o'clock we were two down; at 3:30 one up; at 4:00
one down and, just before the vote, we thought we were two up.
Three men changed their vote on the floor, from what they had
told us in advance. We nearly all had heart failure before it was
over/"*^  The final vote was forty-five for the resolution to seat
Steck and forty-one opposed. Sixteen Republicans, including
Butler, joined twenty-nine Democrats to vote for Steck.
Brookhart had the support of thirty-one Republicans, nine
Democrats, and the one Farmer-Laborite, Henrik Shipstead of
Minnesota."•' Neither Brookhart nor Cummins participated in
the debate, and neither voted. Steck was waiting close by, and al-
most immediately after the vote he was escorted down the aisle
by Senator Cummins and sworn in by Vice-President Dawes.
MacNider received credit for the outcome. Within the hour
one Iowan telegraphed MacNider, "Three rousing cheers. News
just came. You are the man who put it over." Others were equally
enthusiastic. MacNider was thanked for a "truly wonderful vic-
tory," and congratulated on his efforts "to retire Mr. Brookhart from
the Senate." The most effusive letter came from E. J. Feuling. "I ap-
preciate . . . the most effective help you gave to the cause.... May I
say. Jack, that I love you, and I am for you all over, yes a hundred
percent... in fact you are the salt of the earth." MacNider assured
Feuling that he would "gladly do the whole thing over again. . . for
old man Steck." Other observers echoed the opinion of MacNider's
correspondents about his role in the contest. One old friend wrote
to Cummins that the Legion in Iowa was "pretty loud in its protest"
against Brookhart's being seated; Butler and the Republican Na-
tional Committee, he noted, had encouraged the Legion's opposi-
tion and "actually furnished the money." Similarly, in its explana-
tion of what had happened, the Register concluded that "the
President was reached effectively from Iowa, under the leadership
of Hanford MacNider, and he being convinced that Brookhart
ought not to be seated, the New England group led by Butler joined
the Steck forces.""*"
42. MacNider to Marshall, 16 April 1926, Marshall, Verne, MacNider
Papers.
43. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1926, 7301.
44. Robbins to MacNider, 12 April 1926, Robbins, C. B., MacNider Pa-
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There is no doubt that Smith Brookhart won the election in
1924. The first count of the vote showed that he did, and this
was reaffirmed by the official canvass following the election.
Brookhart received a certificate of election from the state of
Iowa. For most electees this would have been enough. Why,
then, did the United States Senate vote to unseat Brookhart? The
answer lies almost solely in the effort of Hanford MacNider and
the Republican Service League and its connections within the
American Legion.""^  Other groups also wanted Brookhart out,
and both political parties in Iowa joined in an effort to oust him,
but the guiding force was MacNider. The leaders of the League
in Iowa did little without informing MacNider or first checking
it with him. It was MacNider who raised money, and it was
MacNider who kept the White House informed.
In Washington MacNider dealt frequently with Senator
Butler, and probably caused Butler's change of mind during the
senatorial debate. The president was certainly involved in the
process as well. Clearly, Brookhart's continuing presence in the
Senate was a source of irritation for the president. Even before
the Emmetsburg speech there had been little empathy between
pers; W. F. Zumbrunn to MacNider, 13 April 1926, Steck, Daniel, MacNider
Papers; William C. McArthur to MacNider, 14 April 1926, Campaign: 1926
Brookhart-Cummins, MacNider Papers; MacNider to Feuling, 1 May 1926,
ibid.; Feuling to MacNider, 28 April 1926, ibid.; MacNider to Feuling, 1 May
1926, ibid.; Ed J. Kelly to Cummins, 15 April 1926, Cummins Papers; Des
Moines Register, 17 April 1926.
45. The American Legion maintained for the record its position of
nonpartisanship. In an editorial on April 23, 1926, the Iowa Legionaire, the of-
ficial publication of the Iowa department, took exception to an International
News Service story that attributed Steck's success to three causes, one being
MacNider and his ability "to bring American Legion pressure against the Iowa
insurgent." The editorial went on to restate that political activity was prohib-
ited by the constitution of the American Legion. It argued further that one Le-
gion post had supported Brookhart, thus proving that the Legion was not mo-
bilized against him. These denials aside, it is clear that the American Legion
posts throughout the country played a role in lobbying for the defeat of
Brookhart. Two Brookhart supporters, George Norris (R-NE) and Hubert D.
Stephens (D-MS), later agreed it was a "matter of general knowledge in the
Senate" that Legionnaires in many states were contacting their senators to
vote against Brookhart. According to.later reports from the Senate, two sena-
tors, "convinced by the reports and the debate that Brookhart" had "been
elected and should [have been] seated," bowed to the pressure from American
Legion officials in their states and voted for Steck. Telegram to Sioux City Trib-
une, 12 May 1926, Kelly, John H., MacNider Papers.
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the two men, and despite the president's pose of disdain about
such things, he was, as one biographer put it, "no innocent"
when it came to playing the political game. He was undoubtedly
receptive when MacNider used his position in the administra-
tion to press the case for Steck, and preceding Butier's change of
position there were talks between the president and his "spokes-
man in the Senate."''^ Of course, both men subsequently issued
statements denying presidential interference."^ But circumstan-
tial evidence clearly indicates White House intervention with
Butler and a key role for MacNider in the process.*^
MACNIDER had scored only a Pyrrhic victory, however. The
"mish-mash" of 1924 now became even more confused, and the
twisted path of Iowa politics took still another turn as former
Senator Brookhart packed his bags to return to Iowa and on
April 17 to announce his candidacy at a rally in Washington. The
introduction by the Reverend Carl W. Klein set the theme for the
campaign. The primary, Klein said, would determine whether
senators from Iowa would be "chosen under state laws or in an
arbitrary way by the Senate."*'
Cummins probably would not have run for reelection in
1926 if circumstances had been different. Writing to various
correspondents in 1924, he had expressed concerns about his
health and age, saying that he was determined not to spend the
years of his "decadence, either physical or mental, in public
office."5° In August 1925 a visitor reported the seventy-five-
46. White, Puritan in Babylon, 264, 319.
47. New York Times, 8 and 9 April 1926.
48. Ronald F Briley, "Smith W. Brookhart and the Limitations of Senator-
ial Dissent," Annals of Iowa 48 (1985), 56-79, attributed Brookhart's unseating
to the desire of Senate Republicans to rid themselves of a troublesome maver-
ick who had not played by their rules. Following the earlier assessment of Ray
Tucker and Frederick R. Barkley in Sons of the Wild Jackass (Boston, 1932), 364,
Briley claims that the Republican administration preferred a "conservative
Democrat to a radical Republican" (74). As I argue here, however, the Republi-
can leadership in the Senate voted against Brookhart only after intense lobby-
ing by Hanford MacNider and the Republican Service League. The unseating
of Smith Brookhart was more a function of Iowa political tensions than a puni-
tive action by the United States Senate.
49. Washington Evening Journal, 19 April 1926.
50. Cummins to James Blythe (brother of CB&Q General Counsel Joseph
W. Blythe), 28 February 1924, Cummins Papers; Cummins to Bert Keltz, 28
November 1924, Cummins Papers.
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year-old senator to be "feeble" and highly unlikely to "live out
another term."^' If Cummins had announced early on that he
would not be a candidate, no one would have thought anything
of it, but once the Brookhart matter had come to a head, he felt
compelled, although "not very keen," to "make the fight."^^ By
mid-March he had decided to run and was soon trying to con-
vince others that he was up to it.
Throughout the campaign Cummins stayed in Washington,
delivering his only speech over a statewide radio hookup. In the
speech he attacked Brookhart by name, charging that his legisla-
tive record was nil and that his criticism of the Transportation
Act was misinformed and unjustified.^^ The speech, though,
followed one by Brookhart, allowing listeners to note the sharp
contrast between Cummins's feebleness and Brookhart's vigor.
Cummins's speech was also permeated with an uneasy nervous-
ness, indicating that he did not like or trust the new medium.
Apparently, he found it difficult to believe that he could speak in
Washington, D.C, and actually be heard in Iowa. '^'
Over four hundred thousand Iowans went to the polls on
primary day. Almost half of them (49.46 percent) voted for
Brookhart. Cummins received 32.52 percent, and three other
candidates split the rest.^ ^ Expressing many Iowans' feelings
about the election, one Polk County farmer commented, "we
sent Brookhart to Washington and we're going to send him back.
We'll show the Senate that when we have sent a man down there
we'll see to calling him home when we want him."^*
Returning to the nation's capital, Brookhart exercised the
privilege of a former senator and sat in a desk on the Senate
floor. He was greeted warmly by many senators, but Albert
Cummins, sitting just four desks away, refused to look at him.
Displaying a wide grin, Brookhart told friends that "fighting in a
good cause" was a "great tonic," adding that he had gained about
51. Robbins to MacNider, 28 August 1925, Robbins, C. B., MacNider
Papers.
52. Cummins to Burt Thompson, 1 March 1926, Cummins Papers.
53. Des Moines Register, 5 June 1926.
54. Ralph Mills Sayre, "Albert Baird Cummins and the Progressive
Movement in Iowa," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1958), 551.
55. Iowa Official Register, 1927-1928, 348-49.
56. Des Moines Register, 9 June 1926.
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ten pounds during the campaign.^^ Soon he was back in Iowa,
where Iowa Republicans were using the remaining weeks of
June and the first weeks of July as a respite before gathering in
Des Moines for the state convention.
As delegates gathered in Des Moines, the Brookhart forces
made no organized move to take over, although understandably
some of his supporters sought seats on the state central commit-
tee. In their search for harmony, Brookhart's supporters also de-
cided not to contest the contents of the platform. Perhaps think-
ing of the future, both sides now seemed determined to avoid
more rancor. If old hatchets were not buried, said Register politi-
cal reporter C. C. Clifton, at least their "sharply tempered edges"
were "for the time being . . . sheathed."^* In the end, there was
enough compromise at the convention to satisfy both sides.
During the convention, Brookhart was seated at the rear of
the platform. He was not scheduled to speak. But when he was
finally persuaded to say a few words, he said he had come to the
conventions for six years with a prepared speech that he had
never been allowed to give:
Six years ago I was defeated for Senator, and I couldn't even get
inside the convention. Four years ago I was successful, and I was
allowed in the last row on the floor. Two years ago I won out
again, and was allowed to sit with my county convention that
time. This year I won again, and here I am, up square on the
platform—positive evidence of the slow but sure advance of civi-
Everything considered, the convention was a remarkable
display of unity. About the only statewide Republican leader not
seen shaking Brookhart's hand was Cummins, who did not at-
tend the convention at all. Even Dante Pierce, editor of the Iowa
Homestead and a former Brookhart supporter, was forced to
admit that Brookhart's support by the convention marked the
"termination of the party split . . . evident since Colonel
Brookhart's first candidacy in 192O."*<'
57. Des Moines Register, 13 and 21 June 1926.
58. Des Moines Register, 20 June, 18, 20, and 21 July 1926.
59. The Union Advocate, 5 August 1926.
60. /owflHomesiead, 29 July 1926.
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Seemingly, Cummins's loss and absence from the conven-
tion freed delegates to put aside old quarrels and look ahead to
the need for unified action in the presidential race of 1928. If
they were not all happy with Brookhart, most felt that, barring
another Emmetsburg, which no one honestly expected, they
were going to have Brookhart for six more years. Resigned to
that fact, they went home feeling that everything was settled.
Then, on July 30, Albert Baird Cummins died. With tributes
pouring in, Iowa's political leaders, including Brookhart, gath-
ered in Des Moines for the funeral. In a statement about
Cummins issued earlier, Brookhart had said, "The greater part of
my political life was spent fighting side by side with Senator
Cummins. . . . [The] later disagreement between us will never
wipe out the memories of those days. His picture hangs by the
picture of Lincoln in my office where it has hung since the be-
ginning of our acquaintance."*'
Because Cummins's term still had seven months to go, po-
litical observers immediately began speculating about the iden-
tity of the person who would be selected to serve out the term.
Under Iowa law the governor could appoint someone to serve
until the next regular election, which in this case was only three
months away. But the remaining four months, the "short term,"
as it came to be known, must be served by an electee, which
meant that the Republicans would have to hold another conven-
tion and nominate another senatorial candidate.
Brookhart considered seeking the short-term nomination,
but realized that the pro-Brookhart sentiments at the earlier con-
vention were no guarantee that he could get a majority of the
delegates to support such a bid. He also realized that making the
bid and losing might well imperil his chances at the full term in
the general election. Accordingly, he decided not to take a
chance with a convention he knew to be filled with Cummins
men, who, it seemed possible, might reject him in order to honor
the memory of their dead hero. The convention eventually
selected the relatively unknown David W. Stewart, a Sioux City
attorney.*^
61. Des Moines Register, 31 July 1926.
62. Des Moines Capital, 6 and 7 August 1926.
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Brookhart won an easy victory in the fall election. The Reg-
ister called his election a "celebration of his reunion with the
Party." Republican Chairman Willis Stern hailed it as marking
the end of the "factional strife" that had enabled the Democrats
to gain a foothold in the Senate two years before.^^ And
Brookhart's associates used the occasion to promise that he
would continue to work for party unity.
BROOKHART acted boldly but foolishly when he ran against
Cummins in 1920. His losing effort only served to earn him the
opposition of regular members of the Republican party. In 1922
he tried to play the game by the accepted rules, working hard to
line up the support of various groups in the state. When that
failed, however, he became embittered, charged betrayal on the
part of organizational and party leaders who flooded the field
against him, and determined to go directly to the people, which
enabled him to win.
Consequently, between 1924 and 1926, those in charge of
the established political machinery united to defeat Brookhart.
In part they acted out of fear of his program; some really be-
lieved that it would lead to socialism or worse. In part they
feared that he intended to remake the Republican party in his
own image, a charge he repeatedly denied and one that most
thoughtful politicians knew to be unfounded since he never
bothered to build the kind of county-by-county organizations
necessary for such a move.^ * In addition, party leaders were
upset that he won without them and thus showed that the politi-
cal party was not necessary as the vehicle for election. Brookhart
aided their efforts by his intemperate speech at Emmetsburg,
giving them an excuse to read him out of the party.
63. Des Moines Register, 3 November 1926.
64. Arthur F. Allen wrote to a friend in August 1926 that it was "practically
certain" that Brookhart would win the election. The fact that he did not get the
nomination for the short term was "not to be regarded as an indication of changed
sentiment" about Brookhart, Allen said, adding, "Brookhart, in his way, is a
shrewd politician." Like Cummins in 1901, Brookhart made his appeal directly to
the people. Cummins, however, was careful to see that his supporters were
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By the end of 1926, though, the "mish-mash" of the last two
years had been replaced by the closest thing to party unity that
Iowa Republicans had known for years. Although it could be
seen as more facade than substance, unity had become the hope
of those bruised by years of internecine war and anxious to put
such battles behind them: it was the hope around which plans
for 1928 were being built. Those involved could take heart from
the realization that Smith Brookhart would not be on a ballot for
another six years.
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